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FOURTH AMENDMENT-DETENTION OF
OCCUPANTS DURING A PREMISES
SEARCH: THE WINTER OF
DISCONTENT FOR PROBABLE
CAUSE
Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
The Supreme Court undertook a major dismantling of the proba-
ble cause requirement of the fourth amendment' by its recent decision
in Michigan v. Summers. 2 In Summers, the Court held that a valid search
warrant implicitly authorizes police to detain an occupant who has left
the premises, even if the seizure lacks probable cause. The Court rea-
soned that the detention can be justified as "reasonable" because the
government interests in crime prevention and officer safety outweigh the
severity of the individual intrusion.
3
In Summers, the Court widened the gap between the once equivalent
fourth amendment terms of "reasonableness" and "probable cause."
Previously, subject to two limited exceptions, 4 a valid, hence, "reason-
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
2 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
3 Id at 2593.
4 The Supreme Court recognized two limited exceptions to the probable cause require-
ment. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court approved a frisk for weapons as a
justifiable response to an officer's reasonable belief that he was dealing with a possibly armed
and dangerous suspect. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Court
upheld brief stops of vehicles at international borders to question occupants about their citi-
zenship. These two probable cause exceptions are not to be confused with other exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Terry and Brignoni-Ponce involved encounters which were "less in-
trusive" than a traditional arrest. The traditional warrant exceptions, however, involve intru-
sions which often amount to full searches or seizures, see C. WHrTEBREAD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 4.03 at 108 (1980). These encounters
are sanctioned by the courts in the interest of officer safety or judicial convenience. Tradi-
tional warrant exceptions include search and seizures incident to a valid arrest, see, e.g.,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); plain view seizures, see, e.g., Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963); searches or seizures while in hot pursuit, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967); and automobile searches and seizures, see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). Administrative searches, another warrant exception, require prior judicial ap-
1246
PREMISES SEARCH
able" seizure5 could occur only when the officer had probable cause to
believe that a felony had been committed by the person to be arrested.
With Summers, the Court has shifted its "reasonableness" focus from the
existence of probable cause to the intrusiveness of the detention.6 After
Summers, seizures which are "less intrusive" than a traditional arrest will
trigger a balancing test to determine their reasonableness, regardless of a
possible lack of probable cause.7 The Court, however, failed to articu-
late, or even agree upon, a standard for determining a "less intrusive"
seizure. This vagueness invites not only confusion and disparity among
courts deciding the propriety of a seizure, but also abuse by police of-
ficers no longer restrained by the more stringent probable cause require-
ment. By expanding the scope of exceptions to the probable cause
requirement, Summers harkens its further deterioration.
I. FACTS OF SUMMERS
On October 10, 1974, Detroit police officers were dispatched to exe-
cute a warrant to search a residence for heroin and any other narcotics
or paraphernalia. 8 The warrant did not name the owner of the prem-
ises. The only reference to a particular person in the warrant was the
statement that a police informant had previously bought heroin at the
address from a black male known as "George." 9
Upon arriving at the residence, Officer Roger Lehman observed
George Summers go out the front door of the building and proceed
down the steps. Summers was stopped and asked to open the door. He
informed the officers "that he could not because he had left his keys
inside, but that he could ring someone over the intercom."10 Dwight
Calhoun came to the door, but refused to admit the officers." The of-
proval before the search can be conducted, but do not require that probable cause attach to
each particular building or location in the scope of the search. Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). But see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(warrantless inventory search, without probable cause, of automobile impounded by police
after a parking violation held not "unreasonable"). For further discussion of the often con-
fused area of warrant exceptions, see generaly Haddad, Well Delineated Eceptions, Claims of
Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 198 (1977).
5 In Terry, the Court stated:
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of persons which do not
eventuate in a trip of the station house and prosecution for crime----"arrests" in tradi-
tional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an indi-
vidual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person.
392 U.S. at 16.
6 101 S. Ct. at 2593.
7 Id
8 People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 440, 286 N.W.2d 226 (1979).
9 Id
10 Id at 441, 286 N.W.2d at 227.
11 Id at 441, 286 N.W.2d at 226-27.
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ficers forced open the door. Once inside, Officer Lehman instructed Of-
ficer Anthony Conant to bring Summers, still on the porch, into the
house. 1
2
The eight occupants of the house were detained, and a subsequent
search of the premises by the officers produced two plastic bags of sus-
pected narcotics. After determining that Summers was the owner of the
house, Officer Conant formally arrested him for violation of the Michi-
gan Controlled Substances Act of 1971.13 A custodial search of Sum-
mers then revealed a plastic bag containing heroin in his jacket pocket.
This heroin formed the basis for Summers' arrest.'
4
On November 19, 1974, the trial court, finding that the police lack-
ed probable cause to arrest Summers, granted a motion to suppress the
evidence and quashed the information. The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. I 5
The Supreme Court of Michigan also affirmed the trial court's
judgment. 16 It determined that Summers' detention amounted to a
seizure under Terry v. Ohio. 17 Citing Dunaway v. New York, 18 the court
emphasized that the general issue in determining the legality of a
seizure-detention is whether the officer had probable cause to arrest, not
whether the officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances.' 9
Holding that the seizure of Summers on his porch, and his subsequent
detention were not limited intrusions permissible under Terry,20 the
court rejected the use of a multi-factor balancing test to determine rea-
sonableness. 21 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
12Id
13 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 335.341(4)(a) (1971) (repealed 1978).
14 407 Mich. at 453, 286 N.W.2d at 232.
15 68 Mich. App. 571, 243 N.W.2d 689 (1976). Under Michigan law, the contraband
found in Summers' basement would have been insufficient to support his conviction in light
of the presence of eight other occupants in his house. See People v. Davenport, 39 Mich. App.
252, 197 N.W.2d 521 (1972). The Michigan Court of Appeals thus concluded that the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest or search Summers. 68 Mich. App. at 580-82, 243
N.W.2d at 693.
16 People v. Summers, 407 Mich. at 450, 286 N.W.2d at 231.
17 Id at 444, 286 N.W.2d at 227-28. The court stated that "the testimony of Officer
Conant at the preliminary examination indicates that the defendant was not free to leave the
front porch as the premises search warrant was executed, but was instead escorted into his
house and deprived of his liberty. At that time, the initial inquiry and cooperative response
terminated. This further detention of the defendant, by bringing him into the house, was a
'seizure' as defined by the United States Supreme Court" (citing Terry v. Ohio, 292 U.S. 1, 19
n.16).
18 442 U.S. 200 (1979). For a further discussion of Dunaway, see text accompanying note
70 infra.
19 407 Mich. 444, 286 N.W.2d at 228.
20 Id at 448, 286 N.W.2d at 230.
21 Id at 448-49, 286 N.W.2d at 230. The majority, per Justice Moody, reasoned that "to
sanction a further detaining of defendant without probable cause would in effect replace the
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determine whether the initial detention of Summers violated his consti-
tutional right to be protected from an unreasonable seizure of his
person.
22
II. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, reversed the
Michigan Supreme Court in a six to three decision.23 It held that a
valid search warrant implicitly authorized the detention of the occu-
pants of the premises, without probable cause, while the search is con-
ducted.24 Justice Stewart, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, disagreed, arguing that such detention is not "reasonable" for
fourth amendment purposes.
2 5
The Summers majority conceded that Summers had been seized
without probable cause.2 6 Although recognizing the general fourth
amendment rule that every seizure having the essential attributes of a
formal arrest is unreasonable if unsupported by probable cause, the ma-
jority held that in determining whether this general rule applies, both
the character of the intrusion and its justification must first be ex-
amined.27 The Court noted that some seizures without probable cause,
significantly less intrusive than an arrest, are not violative of the reason-
ableness standard of the fourth amendment. 28 The majority found
Summers' detention to be a significant restraint on his liberty, yet less
intrusive than the search itself, and "substantially less intrusive" than an
arrest. 29 Justice Stevens was especially influenced by the fact that the
fundamental and essential probable cause standard with a multi-factor balancing test specifi-
cally rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Dunaway." Id. Justice Williams, dis-
senting, suggested that a balancing test be used to determine the legality of the search. Four
criteria would be considered: the existence of exigent circumstances, the necessity for public
protection, whether or not the instruction upon the individual's privacy was reasonably re-
lated to the scope of the circumstances, and, finally, whether or not the seizure was reasonable
in order to protect the officer's safety. Id at 459-63, 286 N.W.2d at 235-37.
22 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
23 101 S. Ct. at 2587.
24 Id at 2595.
25 Id (Stewart, J., dissenting).
26 Id at 2590.
27 Id. at 2593.
28 Id Although acknowledging that in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, it had re-
fused to allow a seizure exception that would swallow the general probable cause rule, the
majority stressed that Dunaway recognized instances in which seizures that were substantially
less instrusive than arrests withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard. 101 S. Ct.
at 2591. It cited as examples Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (stop and frisk), United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (vehicle "stops" near the border if articulable facts exist indi-
cating that the vehicle contains illegal aliens), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
(seizure of gun without probable cause). 101 S. Ct. at 2591-92.
29 Id at 2593. In the majority's view the fact that Summers was leaving the house as the
officers arrived was not constitutionally significant. It maintained that the detention of Sum-
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search warrant authorizing the substantial invasion of privacy was is-
sued by a neutral magistrate.30 He reasoned that since the detention
was in Summers' residence, the detention added little to the public
stigma3' associated with the actual search. 32 Justice Stevens further
maintained that the type of detention imposed upon Summers would
have little potential for police exploitation, since the information the
officers normally seek they could obtain through the search and not
through the detention. 3
3
In determining the justification for the detention, the majority con-
sidered both the law enforcement interests and the "articulable facts"
supporting the detention.3 4 Justice Stevens noted that the most obvious
law enforcement interest facilitated by such detention is the prevention
of flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found.3 5 Second, he
recognized that an interest exists in minimizing the danger to police of-
ficers.36 Finally, Justice Stevens suggested that an orderly search is facil-
itated if the occupants of the premises are present to assist in opening
locked doors and containers in order to avoid delay and the unnecessary
use of force.
37
The majority also considered the nature of the articulable and indi-
vidualized suspicion on which the police based their seizure of Summers.
It stressed that a neutral magistrate, rather than an officer in the field,
had determined that the police should be authorized to invade the pri-
vacy of a home in order to search for contraband.3 8 The majority rea-
mers on the sidewalk outside his residence was no more intrusive than the detention of those
residents inside the house. Id at 2594, n.16.
30 Id at 2593.
31 Justice Stevens appears here to be distinguishing between the public and private stigma
attached to a seizure. However, a detention in one's residence, though never made public
(thus creating no public stigma) might nevertheless be intrusive, or an invasion of privacy.
32 101 S. Ct. at 2593.
33 Id In support of this rationale, Justice Stevens cited Professor LaFave, who has sug-
gested that the reasonableness of a detention may be determined in part by "whether the
police are diligently pursuing a means of investigation which is likely to resolve the matter
one way or the other very soon. . . ." 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 9.2 at 40 (1978). However, Justice Stewart, in dissent, recog-
nized that the logic of the majority's final argument is not immediately clear. 101 S. Ct. at
2598, n. 4 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 100 & accompanying text infra.
34 Id at 2594.
35 Id
36 Id Although finding no evidence of special danger to the officers in the record, the
majority emphasized that warrants to search for narcotics often give rise to sudden violence or
frantic attempts to destroy evidence. Thus, the danger to both police and the occupants of
the searched premises is minimized if the officers are allowed to exercise unquestioned com-
mand of the situation. Id
37 Id
38 Id The majority cited to Justice Jackson's discussion of the significance of such deter-
mination by a neutral judicial officer in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
101 S. Ct. at 2594, n.18.
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soned that the connection of Summers to the house specified on the
search warrant gave the police a substantial, articulable basis for sus-
pecting Summers' involvement with criminal activity, and therefore jus-
tified his detention.
39
The majority relied on the Court's decision in Payton v. New York
40
as the final basis for its holding. In Payton, the Court stated that in
search and seizure cases the interposition of a magistrate's determination
of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen is of prime
importance. Far less significant is the distinction between search and
arrest warrants.41 In Summers, the magistrate would have checked any
initial over-zealous police activity. Thus, if evidence indicating that
Summers' residence harbored contraband was sufficient to support the
issuance of a warrant, then it is also constitutional to detain him while
the search warrant is executed.
42
In his dissent, Justice Stewart expressed his belief that the majority
had gone beyond the two limited exceptions to the general prohibition
of seizures not based on probable cause.43 He argued that Terr, and
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce" do not represent an "exemplary balanc-
ing test" for fourth amendment cases, but rather are two isolated, nar-
39 101 S. Ct. at 2594.
40 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the Court held that police officers may not enter a
private residence to make a routine felony arrest without first obtaining a warrant. In its
holding, however, the Payton Court stated that for fourth amendment purposes "an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a
dwelling in which the suspects lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Id
at 602-03.
4t Id at 602. The majority's position tends to blur the traditional dichotomy between the
requirements needed for a search warrant and those needed for an arrest warrant. Professor
LaFave notes that each requires a showing of probabilities about somewhat different facts
and circumstances. For a search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by substantial
evidence that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and are located in the
place to be searched. A valid arrest warrant issues when the officer has "reasonable grounds
to believe" that a felony has been committed by the person to be arrested. Obviously, there
may be probable cause to search without probable cause to arrest, and vice versa. 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 33 § 3.1 at 442, 443. The Court found this distinction to be crucial in
Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981). In Seagald, the Court held that a valid
arrest warrant does not authorize entrance into the residence of a third party not named on
the warrant. The Court reasoned that an arrest warrant invoked as authority to enter into a
third party's home suffers from the same infirmities as did the writs of assistance used in
England and colonial America. Id at 1651.
42 101 S. Ct. at 2595.
43 Id at 2595-96 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 4 supra. Justice Stewart noted that the
majority had jumped to the "very broad idea that the courts may approve a wide variety of
seizures not based on probable cause so long as the courts find, after balancing the law en-
forcement purposes of the police conduct against the severity of their intrusion, that the
seizure appears 'reasonable'." Id at 2596 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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row exceptions to the probable cause requirement.45 In both cases, the
Court had identified a governmental interest, independent of the ordi-
nary interest in crime prevention, which overcame the presumptive con-
stitutional restraints on police conduct. 46  In Summers, however, no
special governmental or law enforcement interest justified the seizure of
the respondent. The officer's interests in preventing flight and in the
facilitation of an orderly search were no greater than the ordinary police
interests of preventing crime and apprehending wrongdoers.4 7 Justice
Stewart noted that such traditional police activities are the very ones
which the fourth amendment seeks to restrain.
48
Justice Stewart also questioned the majority's view that Summers'
detention was of the limited, unintrusive type that permits the Court to
engage in a "reasonableness" balancing test. 49 Stewart noted that
searches may require several hours for completion, 50 a period of deten-
tion which could scarcely be deemed unintrusive.
III. PRIOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT
Before Terry v. Ohio,-5 the fourth amendment requirement of proba-
ble cause52 for seizures was treated as absolute. 53 Examining the pre-
Tery era, the court in Dunaway v. New York stated:
The standard of probable cause thus represented the accumulated wisdom
of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to
make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. The standard applied to all arrests, without the need
to "balance" the interests and circumstances involved in particular
45 101 S. Ct. at 2595-96 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46 Id Justice Stewart emphasized that in both cases an interest existed beyond that of
ordinary crime prevention. In Teny, the government interest of officer safety justified an
exception to the requirement of probable cause. 392 U.S. at 26. In Brignoni-Ponce, the unique
governmental interest in preventing the entry of illegal aliens, whose presence might create
significant social and economic problems, required the relaxation of the probable cause stan-
dard. 422 U.S. at 879.
47 101 S. Ct. at 2597 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48 Id
49 Id
50 Id at 2598 n.3. Justice Stewart cited Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), in
which an FBI search of a one-bedroom apartment for burglar tools and two checks took five
hours.
51 392 U.S. 1.
52 "Probable cause exists when 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense [has been
committed by the person to be arrested]." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162.).
53 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 208, (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12
(1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)).
1252 [Vol. 72
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situations.54
Thus, before Terry, the terms "reasonableness" and "probable cause"
were synonymous for fourth amendment purposes. The probable cause
requirement was seen as the only acceptable fulcrum between the op-
posing interests of freedom from intrusion and effective law
enforcement. 55
The Supreme Court first recognized an exception to the require-
ment that fourth amendment seizures be based on probable cause in
Terry v. Ohio.5 6 In Terry, the Court held that a stop and frisk without
probable cause may be "reasonable" when an officer has a reasonable
suspicion that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.
57
To assess "reasonableness" a court must determine whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances which justified the original interfer-
ence. 58 Such determination is made by balancing the severity of the
intrusion59 against the opposing interests of crime prevention and officer
54 442 U.S. at 208.
55 "The rule of probable cause is a practical nontechnical conception affording the best
compromise that has been found for accommodating these opposing interests. Requiring
more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officer's whim or caprice." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949).
56 392 U.S. 1. In Terr,a police officer observed two men pacing alternately on an identi-
cal route, pausing to stare in the same store window. Each completion of the route was
followed by a discussion by the two, who at one time were joined by a third man. The officer,
suspecting that the three were planning a break-in, approached them and asked their names.
After receiving a mumbled response, the officer patted down Terry's clothing. The officer
found a pistol in Terry's jacket. Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's denial of Terry's motion to suppress the
weapon as evidence. It conceded that a stop and frisk constituted a "seizure" for fourth
amendment purposes, but nevertheless maintained that such an intrusion was much less se-
vere than that involved in a traditional arrest. The Court held that stop and frisks do not fall
under the concept of arrest, hence exempting them from the general rule requiring probable
cause. Id at 1-7, 20, 26.
57 When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behav-
ior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officers or to
others, it would appear clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take neces-
sary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neu-
tralize the threat of physical harm.
Id at 24. To conduct a valid stop and frisk, an officer does not have to have probable cause.
Rather, he must meet the less stringent requirement of having a "reasonable suspicion" that
the suspect is armed and dangerous. Id at 27.
58 Id at 21. In assessing "reasonableness," the Court stated that "it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that
the action taken was appropriate?" Id at 21-22.
59 The Court stressed that "in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id at 21 (footnote omitted).
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safety.60
Ter, thus represented a departure from the traditional rule that for
fourth amendment purposes, only the presence of probable cause could
demonstrate "reasonableness. '61 Terry defined a special, narrow cate-
gory of seizures which were so unintrusive that courts could employ a
balancing test to determine their reasonableness. After Terr, the Court
carefully maintained the narrow scope of this exception. 62 In such cases
as Adams v. Williams,63 and Pennsylvania v. Mimnms, 64 the Court followed
60 Id at 21. The Court had first employed a balancing test for determining reasonable-
ness under the fourth amendment in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In
Camara, the Court balanced the need to search against the intrusion which the search creates
in approving a "watered-down" test for probable cause for housing inspection warrants. This
same balancing approach was used by the Terry Court to assess the reasonableness of the stop
and frisk. 392 U.S. at 21.
61 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Douglas decried the replacement of the probable cause
requirement for the less stringent, less certain standard of "reasonable suspicion," even for a
narrowly drawn exception as a stop and frisk. Id at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Noting that
a judge can issue a warrant based only upon probable cause, Justice Douglas questioned the
logic of giving the police greater authority to conduct a search or seizure than a judge has to
authorize them. For Justice Douglas, the infringement of personal liberty can be "reason-
able" under the fourth amendment only if such infringement is based on probable cause. Id.
at 37-38. Justice Douglas warned that to give police greater power than a judge is to "take a
long step down the totalitarian path." Id at 38. "[I1f the individual is no longer to be sover-
eign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can
'seize' and 'search' him in their discretion, we enter a new regime." Id at 39.
62 The Tery Court limited its decision to the sanctioning of "a narrowly drawn authority
to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. . . ." Id at 27.
63 In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), a police officer, acting upon an informant's
tip that an individual seated in his car was armed, asked the suspect to open his car door.
When the suspect responded by lowering the window, the officer reached into the car and
found a loaded handgun (which had not been visible from the outside) in the suspect's waist-
band. The suspect was arrested for unlawful possession of a handgun. The Supreme Court,
per Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that the evidence used at trial
resulting in respondent's conviction had been unlawfully obtained. The Court held that the
officer's conduct conformed to the standard enunciated in Ter,. It ruled that reasonable
suspicion for a stop and frisk can be based on an informant's tip, as well as personal observa-
tion. Id at 147.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, citing Judge Friendly's dissenting opinion below, Williams v.
Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), expressed his fear that if Teny
is to be extended to cases of possessory offenses, the "sluicegates [will have opened] for serious
and unintended erosion of the protection of the Fourth Amendment." 407 U.S. at 153 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
64 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), involved a police stop of an automobile
with expired license plates. Mimms complied with the officer's request to step out of the car.
The officer thereupon spotted a bulge under Mimms' sportsjacket. A frisk revealed a loaded
gun. Mimms was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon and an unlicensed
firearm. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, balanced the interest of freedom from
intrusion and effective law enforcement and ruled that the order to step out of the car was
"reasonable" for fourth amendment purposes. Id at 11. It reasoned that once a car is law-
fully detained for a traffic violation, the order to step out was only a de minimis intrusion.
1254 [Vol. 72
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Terry in permitting stops which involved questioning and pat downs of
suspects believed to be armed and dangerous.
The Supreme Court delineated a second narrow exception to the
requirement of probable cause in United States v. Bngnoni-Ponce,65 when it
held that brief vehicle stops near our international borders to question
occupants about their citizenship were reasonable under the fourth
amendment.66 In Bgnoni-Ponce, the Court affirmed the Court of Ap-
peals' ruling that the ancestry of the passengers alone was not enough to
make the seizure reasonable under the fourth amendment. 67 The Court
went on to rule, however, that roving border patrol stops based upon
articulable facts 68 that reasonably warrant the suspicion that the vehicle
may contain illegal aliens are "reasonable" under the fourth amend-
ment, despite the lack of probable cause. The Court balanced the need
for border stops to help stem the flow of illegal aliens against the modest
intrusion 69 of the stop, and ruled that such intrusions were justified.
The Court warned, however, that the officer must have probable cause
to support any further search or detention beyond minimal questioning
concerning citizenship or immigration status.
70
In Dunaway v. New York, 71 the Court refused to extend the balancing
test to a situation where a suspect was taken without probable cause to a
police station for questioning.72 It held that Dunaway's custodial inter-
The Court held that once the bulge was observed in Mimms' jacket, any man of "reasonable
caution" would have conducted the frisk. Id at 112.
65 422 U.S. 873.
66 In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the Court held that the
fourth amendment prohibits the use of roving patrols to search vehicles removed from the
border, or its functional equivalents, when no warrant or probable cause exists. In United
States v. Bgnoni-Ponce, members of the United States border patrol made a roving patrol stop
of a vehicle near the California-Mexico border. The officer's decision to stop the vehicle was
based solely on his observation that the three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent.
Questioning of the three revealed that the two passengers were aliens who had entered the
country illegally. All three were arrested, and Brignoni-Ponce was charged with two counts
of knowingly transporting illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976) 422 U.S.
at 875.
67 Id at 885-86.
68 "Articulable facts" would include information concerning illegal border crossings in the
area, a driver's behavior, and the observation of people trying to hide. Citing Tey, the Court
stated "[i]n all situations, the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in
detecting illegal entry and smuggling." Id at 885.
69 Investigative stdps usually consume "less than a minute." Brief for United States at 25,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). There is no search of the vehicle or
occupants. Usually, all that is required is response to a few brief questions or the production
of a document which affirms the individual's right to be in the United States. 422 U.S. at
880.
70 Id at 881-82.
71 442 U.S. 200.
72 In Duaway, Rochester, New York police received information implicating Dunaway in
an attempted robbery and homicide. Although the tip was insufficient to establish probable
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rogation was substantially different from the less intrusive seizures of
Terry and its progeny.73 It contended that, unlike the narrowly circum-
scribed seizures of Tery frisks, the detention of Dunaway was in many
respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.74 The Court
stressed that any "exception" that could cover a seizure as intrusive as
Dunaway's "would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth
Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause."
'75
The Dunaway Court expressly refused to adopt a multifactor bal-
ancing test of "reasonable police conduct under the circumstances" to
cover all seizures which do not amount to technical arrests. It expressed
its fear that fourth amendment protections could disappear in the bal-
ancing of the numerous factors that would necessarily be involved in
each case. 76 The Court stressed that a single, familiar standard is
needed to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise
to balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront. 77 It maintained that, for all but narrowly
defined intrusions, the requisite balance has been embodied in the prin-
ciple that seizures are reasonable only if supported by probable cause. 78
IV. ANALYSIS
With its holding in Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court has
shifted the focus of review for fourth amendment seizures from the exist-
ence of probable cause to the "intrusiveness" of the seizure. The intru-
siveness of the seizure now becomes the principle for assessing its
validity. The Summers Court failed, however, to articulate a working
standard for "intrusiveness." This failure invites confusion among
courts assessing the validity of a seizure, as well as abuse by police of-
cause, Dunaway was taken into custody and transported to police headquarters for question-
ing. Although Dunaway was not told he was under arrest, he would have been physically
restrained had he attempted to leave. After being given proper Miranda warnings, Dunaway
was interrogated by the officers. He eventually made statements and drew sketches that in-
criminated him in the crime. The trial court granted Dunaway's motion to suppress the
statements and sketches due to the officer's lack of probable cause to effect the seizure. Id at
203.
i3 Id at 212.
74 I' Dunaway was not questioned briefly when found, but was taken to a police car,
transported to the police station and placed in an interrogation room. He was not free to
leave. Id
75 Id at 213.
76 Id The Court feared that fourth amendment protections could disappear "in the con-
sideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases, espe-
cially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by police officers engaged in the
'often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime'" (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
77 442 U.S. at 213-14.
78 Id at 214.
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ficers no longer guided by the more clearly defined standard of probable
cause.
The Summers majority determined that before it could decide
whether Summers' detention fell within the general rule requiring prob-
able cause, it had to examine the character of the intrusion.79 Under
Summers, probable cause must still support an "intrusive" seizure. If,
however, seizure is deemed "significantly less intrusive than an arrest,"
the Court will balance the intrusion upon the individual against the
articulable law enforcement interests in order to determine reasonable-
ness.80 No longer is the objective presence of probable cause the pre-
eminent factor in determining the validity of a fourth amendment
seizure. Instead, the Court has invited uncertainty by allowing an un-
clear intrusiveness standard to trigger a balancing test. Summers goes far
to confirm Justice Marshall's fear that the Terry balancing test would
not be a narrowly defined exception, but a general rule to be applied in
all instances.81
A. FAILURE TO ARTICULATE A STANDARD FOR "INTRUSIVENESS"
In Summers, the Court failed to articulate a definite standard for
"intrusiveness." Indeed, the Justices were unable to agree among them-
selves as to whether Summers' detention was "significantly less intru-
sive" than a traditional arrest. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
argued that Summers' detention, although a significant restraint on lib-
erty, was "surely less intrusive than the search itself."'82 He reasoned
that most citizens would want to remain in order to observe the search
of their possessions, unless they intended to flee to avoid arrest.8 3 The
majority provided no further explanation, however, to support its con-
clusion that Summers' detention was unintrusive.
Justide Stewart, in dissent, noted that the majority's holding,8 4
could lead to a detention without probable cause of several hours if a
79 101 S. Ct. at 2593.
80 Id at 2594.
81 In his dissent in Adams v. Williams, Justice Marshall stated that:
In today's decision the Court ignores the fact that Teny begrudgingly accepted the neces-
sity for creating an exception from the warrant requirement of the Fourth amendment
and treats this case as if warrantless searches were the rule rather than the "narrowly
drawn" exception. This decision betrays the careful balance that Terry sought to strike
between a citizen's right to privacy and his government's responsibility for effective law
enforcement and expands the concept of warrantless searches far beyond anything here-
tofore recognized as legitimate.
407 U.S. 143, 154-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82 101 S. Ct. at 2593 (footnote omitted).
83 Id
84 Justice Stewart quoted the majority holding as follows: "a warrant to search for con-
traband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is being conducted." Id at 2595.
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thorough, lengthy search was conducted.8 5 Since the majority had pro-
vided little guidance for its intrusiveness standard, this obviously intru-
sive detention would nevertheless be authorized by the majority's
holding. For Justice Stewart, the probable cause requirement continues
to embody the best compromise for accommodating the competing in-
terests of safeguarding individual privacy and enforcing the law.
86
The majority opinion failed to look beyond the factual circum-
stances of Summers and thus falls short of setting a workable standard for
future determinations of instrusiveness. The majority did not provide
the lower courts with a clear line of demarcation separating "intrusive"
and "less intrusive" seizures. By failing to establish a workable stan-
dard, the Court has opened the door for confusion and disparity in the
ascertainment of a "reasonable" seizure under the fourth amendment.
B. VIEWS CONCERNING A BALANCING OF INTERESTS
The Supreme Court has previously addressed the issue of balancing
the opposing interests of freedom from intrusion and effective law en-
forcement.8 7 Most recently, in Dunaway v. New York, 88 the Court ex-
pressly rejected the notion of extending the balancing test to all seizures
not amounting to a technical arrest. It expressed fear that fourth
amendment protections could easily disappear "in the balancing of mul-
tifarious circumstances presented by different cases .... "89 The Sum-
mers decision ignored this warning, and invites the dangers that a
balancing approach can create.
Advocates of a balancing approach believe that justice might be
better served by weighing the opposing interests involved. Many com-
mentators deplore the fact that obviously guilty defendants are set free
because of a comparatively minor police intrusion of privacy. 90 They
contend that rigid fourth amendment standards often limit pre-arrest
investigative techniques, and afford more protection to the law-breaker
than to the law-abiding citizen.9 1 Under a balancing approach, stan-
dards would be flexible enough to make allowances for minor police
85 Id at 2598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86 Id
87 See, e.g. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523.
88 442 U.S. 200.
89 Id at 213 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
90 See S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 60-61, (1977); Wilkey, The Eclusionag
Rule.- Why Suppress Valid Evidence, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Comment, Contempt of Court As
An Alternative to the Exclusionag Rule, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 993, 1019 (1981).




intrusions in light of a pressing law enforcement interest.92
The benefits of such a balancing test may be outweighed by the
confusion and potential abuse which it invites. Commentators have ex-
pressed doubt whether a case-by-case balancing approach is the most
practical for solving probable cause issues.93 Professor Wayne LaFave
noted that a balancing approach is of little help if the balancing is so
difficult and unpredictable that police or judges are consistently unable
to reach a proper conclusion.94 Professor Anthony Amsterdam has also
expressed concern over the confusion that adoption of a balancing ap-
proach would cause, suggesting that it would convert the fourth amend-
ment into "one immense Rorschach blot."'95 For Professor Amsterdam,
the varieties of police behavior and the occasions that call it forth are so
innumerable that "their reflection in a general sliding scale approach
would only produce more slide than scale."
'96
A balancing test invites police abuse as well. 97 In his dissenting
opinion in Brinegar v. United States,98 Justice Jackson warned that any
privilege of warrantless search and seizure sustained by the courts will
92 Professor Bartlett asks:
Would not the policy of the Fourth Amendment be better served by an approach which
determines the reasonableness of each investigative technique by balancing the serious-
ness of the suspected crime and the degree of reasonable suspicion possessed by the police
against the magnitude of the invasion of the personal security and property rights of the
individual involved?
Id at 63 (footnote omitted).
93 See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33 § 3.2 at 451; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 388-95 (1974).
94 If by a process of balancing a multitude of factors and considerations it can be said
that the theoretically "correct" result regarding probable cause would be reached 100%
of the time, but the test so construed is so difficult to comprehend and apply that officers
and judges with the best of intentions will be able to apply it correctly only 75% of the
time, it might well be argued that we are better off with a more crude probable cause
rule that will produce the theoretically "correct" result 90% of the time but which is clear
enough that the instances of good faith erroneous application will be extremely
infrequent.
2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 3.2 at 451.
95 Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 393. Professor Amsterdam believes that the current state
of the law is a "paragon of simplicity" compared to what a graduated fourth amendment
would produce. Id Similar sentiments to those of Professor Amsterdam were expressed by
Professor Bacigal: "Because of the complex valuation judgments involved, a court may find it
nearly impossible to verbalize the balance of competing interests struck in any case." Bacigal,
The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 763, 781
(footnote omitted).
96 Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 394.
97 Id Professor Amsterdam noted that "reasonableness" under a balancing approach
would be decided in the first instance by the trial court. The result would be that appellate
courts defer to the trial courts and the trial courts will defer to the police. He argues that if
there are no clear rules defining police behavior, courts will seldom deem a policeman's con-
duct "unreasonable."
98 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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be interpreted and pushed to the limit by police officers. 99 In Summers,
the Court maintained that the type of detention imposed on Summers is
not likely to be exploited or unduly prolonged by an officer because the
information the officer normally seeks will be obtained through the
search, not through the seizure. ' 00 This reasoning is rather opaque, for
it suggests that the reason for detaining a suspect is the convenience of
having him available for arrest. It ignores the temptation for police of-
ficers to use such detention as a back-up "secondary evidence source" in
the event that the search is not fruitful.10 1 Police convenience, in any
event, does not constitute a justifiable rationale for detaining an individ-
ual, possibly for hours, without probable cause.
The probable cause test is an objective one.102 Probable cause can-
not be established by a policeman's subjective belief that he has grounds
for his action.' 0 3 Rather, the detached, neutral magistrate must evalu-
ate the reasonableness of a proposed search or seizure in light of its par-
ticular circumstances before probable cause is adjudged to be present. 104
The adoption and maintenance of this safeguard to civil liberties was a
reaction to the tyranny experienced in colonial times. t0 5 When the
Court in Terry and Brignoni-Ponce saw need to allow exceptions to the
probable cause requirement, they were careful to limit the exception to
a narrow scope of circumstances. As noted by Justice Stewart in his
Summers dissent, the unusual law enforcement interest justifying the ex-
ceptions provided a limiting prifnciple insuring the narrowness of police
action.10 6 In Summers, the nature of the law enforcement interest is not
99 Id at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
100 101 S. Ct. at 2593. In Summers, however, Summers was charged with possession of the
heroin found on his person, and was not charged with possession of the heroin found in his
house during the initial search.
101 As Justice Stewart noted in dissent, the majority's view begs the question whether the
duration of the search threatens the person with a lengthy detention. Id at 2598, n.4 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting).
102 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33 § 3.2 at 459. See also C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 113.
103 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 33 § 3.2 at 459.
104 Id
105 As explained by the Court in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959):
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The general
warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of
assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice
of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of
judicial control, since no showing of "probable cause" before a magistrate was required.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted June 12, 1776, rebelled against that prac-
tice ....
That philosophy later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early
American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common ru-
mor or report, suspicion or even "strong reason to suspect" was not adequate to support a
warrant for arrest. And that has survived to this day.
Id at 100-01 (footnotes omitted).
106 101 S. Ct. at 2596-97 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1260 [Vol. 72
PREMISES SEARCH
unusual, but, rather, represents the ordinary police interest in prevent-
ing crime. Summers does not provide a limited situation or narrow law
enforcement interest which would minimize the possibilities of arbitrary
and unlawful detention. In failing to do so, Summers places in serious
jeopardy the protective wall of probable cause.
C. APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST IN MICHIGAN V. SUMMERS
The Summers decision demonstrates how improper application of a
balancing test could erode fourth amendment protections. In "balanc-
ing test" cases such as Terry and Brignoni-Ponce,10 7 narrow exceptions
were granted only in light of a greater governmental interest than the
ordinary interest in investigating crime. 08 In its balance of competing
interests, the Summers majority justified the detention of Summers with
three separate law enforcement interests: the prevention of flight in the
event that incriminating evidence is found, the facilitation of the search
by having the occupants available for needed assistance, and the mini-
mization of the risk of harm to officers.'0 9 The first two interests would
appear to be common law enforcement interests present in every seizure.
situation.
Almost every police-suspect encounter creates the possibility that
the suspect will flee. Few searches could not be facilitated by the pres-
ence of the homeowner. To allow these interests to justify a probable
cause exception would sanction the total demise of the requirement.
Rarely would police be unable to use these factors as a justification for
ignoring the requirement of probable cause.
The minimization of risk to police officers was not an interest which
could logically justify the detention of Summers, and, in fact, the Sum-
mers majority conceded that the record suggested no such danger in Sum-
mers."10 It maintained, nevertheless, that a search warrant for narcotics
is the type that may give rise to sudden violence." ' This danger, how-
ever, is present in many other areas of police work as well. Moreover,
the danger was far less substantial than in the Te ry situation, where the
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and danger-
ous."12 Summers would appear to exempt from the probable cause re-
quirement all police conduct related to narcotics, and conceivably, any
107 See note 4 supra.
108 In Tern,, the independent interest was the protection of police officers. 392 U.S. at 23.
In Brignoni-Ponce, the social and economic need to reduce the flow of illegal immigration
justified making a narrow exception to the probable cause requirement. 422 U.S. at 878-79.
109 101 S. Ct. at 2594.
110 Id
111 Id
112 392 U.S. at 28.
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other police activity in which the possibility of sudden violence exists.
This creates a gaping hole in the probable cause requirement, a gap
which swallows the narrowly drawn exceptions for weapon frisks and
border searches.
V. CONCLUSION
In Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court has gone well beyond
the spirit of the limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement.
The Summers decision places the focus on the intrusiveness of the seizure,
rather than the existence of probable cause. The Court has opened the
door for confusion and abuse, however, by failing to define what consti-
tutes "intrusiveness" in triggering a balancing test for the opposing in-
terests of freedom from intrusion and law enforcement. In turn, the
Summers Court's actual application of the balancing test demonstrates
the real possibility that fourth amendment protections may be lost in
the process of assessing the weights of various opposing interests. The
Summers decision makes more unclear the already murky waters of the
fourth amendment.
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